EXHIBIT B

P561NYSA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 25 Civ. 2990 (ER) v. 6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., 7 Defendants. Oral Argument 8 -----x New York, N.Y. 9 May 6, 2025 10:00 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. EDGARDO RAMOS, 12 District Judge 13 **APPEARANCES** 14 NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 15 Attorneys for Plaintiffs BY: ANDREW S. AMER, ESQ. STEPHEN C. THOMPSON, ESQ. 16 Assistant Attorneys General 17 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 18 Attorneys for Defendants BY: CHRISTOPHER K. CONNOLLY, ESQ. 19 DANA W. KUMAR, ESQ. Assistant United States Attorneys 20 21 22 23 2.4 25

22

23

24

25

1 (Case called) 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your names 3 for the record. 4 MR. AMER: Good morning, your Honor. Andrew Amer with 5 the New York Attorney General's Office. I'll be presenting the 6 argument for the plaintiffs today. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. 8 MR. AMER: Good morning. 9 MR. THOMPSON: Good morning, your Honor. Stephen 10 Thompson, also from the New York State Office of the Attorney 11 General. 12 MR. CONNOLLY: Good morning, your Honor. Christopher 13 Connolly from the US Attorney's Office on behalf of defendants. 14 MR. KUMAR: Good morning, your Honor. Dana Kumar, 15 also from the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District 16 of New York, on behalf of the defendants. 17 THE COURT: Good morning to you all. This matter is 18 on for a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction 19 brought on behalf of the State of New York, 15 other states, 20 and the District of Columbia. 21 Mr. Amer, I'll hear you.

MR. AMER: Thank you, your Honor.

Again, for the record, Andrew Amer with the New York Attorney General's Office.

On March 28th of this year, your Honor, the Department

of Education and Secretary McMahon pulled the rug out from under the plaintiff-states when they cut short by a full year the period for the states to draw down on nearly \$1 billion of education-stabilization funding that Congress had appropriated and that the Education Department had already awarded to them. And without even a minute's advance notice, the defendants declared that the states' window to liquidate those funds had already expired, a full year before the extensions had permitted them to draw down on those funds.

The Department's actions have upended ongoing programs and projects intended to address the devastating impact of COVID-19 on K-12 students and teachers. Our motion asks the Court to preliminarily enjoin this agency action in order to maintain status quo pending resolution of this case.

I'd like to first address irreparable harm if that's okay with the Court, but I did want to just briefly review how we got to where we are.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. AMER: A few years ago, your Honor, the states submitted detailed grant applications for funding under COVID appropriation laws, which the Department approved, confirming that the projects were eligible under the appropriating legislation. The Department awarded billions of dollars in funding under this appropriation statute. For example, just to name two of the appropriations, the two that received the

largest amounts, California received an appropriation of—an award of \$15 billion, New York received an award of \$9 billion. The states then submitted extension requests, providing detailed explanations for why they needed more time to draw down on these funds. As an example of these extension requests, the Court can look at Exhibit 4 to the New York declaration, which is Docket No. 26. It's quite detailed.

The Department granted the states' extension requests based on specifically finding that the states had provided sufficient justification and documentation and extended the liquidation period for an additional 14 months, through March of 2026. Now the state education agencies relied on both the initial grant awards and the extension approvals through March of 2026 in planning their budgets, in developing and launching programs and projects using the funding, and in entering into contracts with vendors. Programs and projects were ongoing when the extension approvals were rescinded on March 28th.

THE COURT: Can I ask just a couple of questions on that.

MR. AMER: Certainly.

THE COURT: First of all, I don't believe that this is an issue in this case, but were there any restrictions on how the funds could be used by the local and state school authorities?

MR. AMER: There were, your Honor, because the monies

were appropriated for specific types of programs and projects, and in seeking the grants in the original applications, the state education agencies had to describe the projects and programs that were going to be funded by this money. And so when the state education agencies seek reimbursement for funds during their window, they need to show that the projects are the same ones for which the funds were granted. In other words, it has to match; the reimbursement request has to match up with what the grants were awarded for in the first instance.

THE COURT: So you have to provide receipts, as it were.

MR. AMER: Yes. Effectively, yes.

THE COURT: And then some of these projects were for infrastructure projects, correct?

MR. AMER: That's correct. In the appropriating legislation, there was money that was made available for improving facilities—for example, ventilation. It was all intended to address the need to prevent the spread of virus, not only for COVID-19 but in the future, for whatever other viruses might happen in the future.

THE COURT: And as I understand it, the monies for which you received an extension, I guess you received an extension to draw those monies down, correct?

MR. AMER: Correct. The initial 120-day period in the statute ran the end of January of 2025, I believe, and Congress

allowed extensions for another 14 months, and when those extension requests were made, they were quite detailed. Like I said, if you look at Exhibit 4 to the New York declaration, you'll see it's very detailed. And there was a specific finding by the Education Department when granting those extension requests that sufficient justification and

THE COURT: And the monies that we're talking about for which you requested an extension to liquidate, were those, in what I understand government parlance to be, appropriated funds?

documentation had been provided.

MR. AMER: They were not only appropriated funds, they were funds that had already been awarded in the grant award notifications, so they were monies that the states understood they were already entitled to under the grants. They just hadn't tapped them yet, they hadn't liquidated them yet, because their projects were ongoing and this is a reimbursement-type process.

THE COURT: And again, it doesn't appear to be part of the dispute here, but to your knowledge, did the federal government refuse to reimburse any projects that were submitted by the various states?

MR. AMER: I'm not aware that that happened, and I would say, your Honor, in fact, prior to February of 2025, the reimbursement process was automated, and there is evidence in

the record that under that procedure, the states typically received reimbursement the next business day following the request. So this was a very cursory ministerial review of payment requests that just checked to make sure that the receipts—if we'll call them that—matched up with what the awards were originally approved for.

THE COURT: Okay. So there was no controversy or dispute concerning the nature of the projects that the various school authorities engaged in and sought reimbursement for; is that right?

MR. AMER: That's correct. I mean, to the extent that states were seeking monies for projects that were not eligible, they wouldn't have been given those funds in the grant award.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. AMER: So in addressing irreparable harm, I wanted to approach this by describing the four buckets of irreparable harm as we see it, established by the declarations in the record.

First, a portion of the grants go directly to the state education agencies to cover the cost of administering the grant programs. We're talking about, again, billions of dollars. It takes a fair amount of overhead to administer the programs for the local education agencies and the nonpublic schools that are eligible for this funding. And most notably, this goes to pay staff to administer these programs. Each

state's administrative apparatus is being adversely impacted by the agency action, and in fact some administrative arrangements are already being dismantled by the states, as evidenced by the declarations, because the funding is now gone as a result of the Department's actions, and that includes laying off staff and furloughing staff.

THE COURT: And has that already happened?

MR. AMER: It has. And I would refer the Court to the Illinois declaration at paragraph 25—that's Docket No. 18—the New York declaration at 55-57, paragraphs 55-57, and that's Docket No. 26. It's happened already, and it's continuing to happen.

Second, programs and services to compensate for lost instruction time to students are being halted with no ability of the states to pick up the tab to keep these programs running. This has real adverse consequences for students and their ability to catch up for all the lost time due to the pandemic. It's important, your Honor, to understand that due to budget timing, the states are simply not in a position to consider now whether and how the states and their legislatures might be able to appropriate funds to continue these programs because the states never needed to pursue that option, given that the federal government stepped up to the plate and, through the American Rescue Plan, made these funds available. So this is a lost opportunity for the states that translates

into irreparable harm. And unfortunately, it's just too late for the states to step in and consider being able to continue these vitally important programs for students.

Third, vendors, local education agencies, and nonpublic schools have already incurred expenses that they were expecting would be reimbursed from the grant monies, but they are now left holding the bag because the funding is no longer available. Now this exposes the states to potential lawsuits, which of course have attendant defense costs. And that's in the record, the New York declaration, paragraph 61. Again, it's Docket No. 26.

THE COURT: What is a nonpublic school?

MR. AMER: Nonpublic schools are religious schools and private schools.

THE COURT: Okay. And the various acts don't make any distinctions between those entities.

MR. AMER: Actually, there are three different programs that are involved here. It will test my memory of the acronyms, but there are the ESSER funds, which is public schools; there's the Homeless Children and Youth; and then there's the EANS program, and that is for the nonpublic schools, the final one.

Fourth, your Honor, the vendors are refusing to perform services under existing contracts. This includes contractors who are just walking off construction projects,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

leaving schools with areas that are unusable and unsafe. In fact, the New York declaration at paragraphs 47-49 attests to the fact that there are some facilities that now have gaping holes in the walls and the ceiling because ventilation upgrade projects have been halted since the contractors have walked off the site in light of the March 28th letter rescinding the extension approvals. This clearly adversely affects the states' ability to provide for the basic educational needs of their students.

Now the defendants have basically one response to all Their response is that in fact there is no of this harm. irreparable harm here because the states can seek project-specific extension requests. So let me be clear. our position that there simply is no equivalence between the right that the states had to submit timely payment requests prior to 5 p.m. on March 28th, which were subject to this cursory ministerial review, and their ability now under this new process to ask for project-specific extensions. Before the rescission letter, state education agencies had to submit a fairly—had to submit these payment requests, and as I mentioned, they were subject to pretty ministerial, minimal review, and in fact, states were receiving payment within the next business day when it was done on an automated process. Post-rescission letter, this new process that the defendants contend is just as good clearly is not. The states are

stripped of their ability to submit payment requests that are viewed as timely, and instead they now must submit extension requests all over again. They're starting from square one. And they have to do so on a project-specific basis, which was never the case in terms of how they had to request the prior extensions. Each project must be—each project-specific request must be supported by detailed information, as listed in the Department's April 3rd letter, and it has to include a justification as to why the Department should grant the extension.

THE COURT: But hadn't that already been done? In order to qualify for payment in the first instance, didn't you have to submit information concerning the projects that you wanted to undertake and why they were within the purview of the funding statutes? Wasn't that already done?

MR. AMER: Absolutely, your Honor. In fact, what was done prior, if you include the original application for the grant, was even more extensive. But yes, all of that. It simply ignores the history here of the Department having already approved the grants initially and then approving the prior extension requests, and those extension requests were granted based on specific findings by the Department that each state had provided a sufficient justification and documentation.

THE COURT: Can you give me an idea of how many

different projects, say, California and New York were running that were subject to these programs?

MR. AMER: We have in the record spreadsheets, and I can get the number for you, but if you look at Exhibit 4 to the New York declaration, you'll see all of the projects that are the subject of the extension requests. It's dozens for both of those states, because they're large states, obviously. And the amount of money that was remaining for this funding as of March 28th is tens of millions for some states and more than a hundred million for other states. So New York, for example, was about 134 million, I think. A number of states had eight-and nine-figure sums left on their funding to draw down on. So still a significant amount of money we're talking about here, your Honor, as of the date of the rescission letter.

THE COURT: And was it the intent of the various agencies to ultimately draw down all of those funds or were there going to be some left over?

MR. AMER: I believe it was the intent to use all the funds, but, you know, it's possible that come March of 2026, they might not have tapped all of the funding, but I think it was certainly the intent to do so.

The new process also runs contrary to the urging of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. That committee had urged the Department to adopt a procedure for extension requests that would impose minimal burden on the states, and in

fact, that was the case for the prior extension request round, if you will. There's simply no indication in the record, your Honor, of how long this new process—which is a six-step process of review, including two different levels of management within the Department that's outlined in the April 3 letter—simply no indication in the record of how long that review would take, nor do we know how likely it is that any project-specific extension will be approved.

In short, your Honor, the new process gives the states no assurance or comfort that they will be able to liquidate anywhere close to the funding that was awarded and that remained unliquidated, and they will have no clarity on that issue any time soon, given this six-step process that the Department purports they will undertake.

I would also mention, your Honor, that both the administration and Secretary McMahon have mentioned any number of times in public that the ultimate goal here is to completely dismantle the Department of Education. That's something the Court can take judicial notice of. It's been reported in the press widely. And they make no—they don't dispute that that's the ultimate goal. That does not bode well, your Honor, for the prospect of this new process and its review happening in a prompt and timely manner. We submit, your Honor, that what is really going on here is that the Department is trying to just wipe the slate clean and get a do-over, not just on the prior

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

decision to grant the extensions but also to award the grants in the first instance. That is clear from the Department's April 3 letter, which requires states seeking project-specific extension under this new process to explain how a particular project is necessary to mitigate the effects of COVID rather than just focusing on why they need more time.

I did want to mention, by the way, just to circle back, New York had approximately 85 projects underway for those three funding programs that I mentioned.

I want to move next to the likelihood of success prong, your Honor, and address first the threshold question that defendants have raised of whether this is a final agency action subject to review under the APA. This case focuses on the Department's two determinations conveyed in the March 28th letter—the first being the rescission of the prior approvals, and the second, the determination to declare that the liquidation periods already expired as of 5 p.m. on March 28th. We submit there is absolutely nothing tentative about those determinations. They are not subject to any further agency And those two determinations have immediate legal consequences for the states. The states no longer have the right to submit timely payment requests to liquidate their grant funds that would be subject to a cursory ministerial Now the defendants conflate these two determinations review. with some future decision that the Department may reach about

2.4

whether to grant extensions on a project-specific basis, but that's an entirely different agency action and it's simply not relevant to the question of whether the two determinations encompassed in the March 28th letter are now final. But I would add, your Honor, that even if the Court considers this new process of seeking project-specific extensions to be some sort of reconsideration of the March 28th determinations, the APA expressly forecloses their argument that it's not final under Section 704 because that section says that even if there's reconsideration, it doesn't make agency action nonfinal unless the agency action is inoperable pending the outcome of the reconsideration. And here, they say it's effective immediately, not that it's inoperable.

So for those reasons, your Honor—

THE COURT: In other words, if the Department of Education were to say, we are rescinding the grants that were made in two weeks, for example—

MR. AMER: I think it would have to be more than that. I think, under Section 704, they would have to say, we are going to rescind subject to this process of a project-specific extension, and our rescission remains inoperable pending our consideration and decision on any project-specific extension you want to make.

THE COURT: So status quo continues, and you can submit the requests for reimbursement in the meantime.

MR. AMER: Exactly right, your Honor, and it makes sense that Section 704 says that because it by design means that there's no impact of the agency action until this reconsideration process plays out and there's a definitive determination.

Another threshold issue that defendants have raised is prudential ripeness. For the same reason that the agency action is final, we believe that it's also fit for review by this Court because there's nothing more that the agency need do in terms of its consideration, and absent the Court's review, the states will endure the hardship of the irreparable harm that I've already discussed. And so those are the two prongs of the prudential ripeness test that are clearly met here.

I wanted to turn next to the substantive claims under our likelihood of success prong and just talk about the two APA claims, the first being arbitrary and capricious. Your Honor, this is a classic case of an agency changing position without complying with the change in position doctrine that requires a reasoned explanation and accounting for the significant reliance interest of the plaintiff. And I should mention that the Supreme Court has very recently discussed this change in position doctrine in the FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs. case that was decided April 2nd of this year; that's at 2025 WL 978101. The March 28th letter provides the only explanation from the Department for its about-face on the extension

approvals, and their explanation boils down to saying that because the pandemic is over, there's no extra time warranted for the states to have in order to liquidate hundreds of millions of dollars that remain in funding. This makes no sense, for two reasons, your Honor.

First, the end of the pandemic is not a new development. The federal government declared the pandemic to be over in May of 2023. That's when the health emergency was declared at an end. That is long before the Department granted the extensions that it is now rescinding, and some of those extensions were granted as recently as January and February of this year, so 2025. So there's nothing new here that would justify and provide a reasoned explanation in terms of the timing of the health emergency being over.

Second, the state education agencies, as the Court has already noted, previously provided, and the Department already accepted as warranted, the explanations given by the states in support of the prior extension requests for why more time was needed to put these funds to use. And I'll just give you two examples.

The states previously explained that they needed more time to implement and continue programs like after-school classes and summer school and extended school year programs to make up for lost instruction time. The fact that the pandemic ended in 2023 didn't obviate the need for this critical

intervention to help the students catch up from the pandemic and the lost instruction time.

Another example is that the states already explained that supply chain disruptions due to the pandemic require them to take additional time to complete construction projects, like HVAC upgrades.

So those explanations have already been provided and have already been accepted.

The defendants ignore the states' reliance on the extensions, the second part of the change in position test. It's clear from the declarations that state education authorities—agencies and local education agencies factored into their budgets program planning and contracting with vendors their ability to continue to liquidate the grant funds through March of 2026, each of these entities incurring costs they expected would be reimbursed through timely payment requests, subject, again, to a cursory ministerial review by the Department. So in the absence of a reasoned explanation and no accounting for the substantial reliance interests, it's clear that this action by the defendants violates the change in position doctrine.

The second substantive claim under the APA is contrary to law. I'll just briefly mention the two points there that we think indicate the states are highly likely to succeed on that claim.

First, Congress clearly intended the funds to remain available after the end of the health emergency. Congress specifically did not tie the funds to the continuing existence of the health emergency, as it did with other COVID funding. And we cite to a number of statutes on page 24 of our opening brief that illustrate Congress tying the funds to the health emergency. So Congress knew how to do it, and didn't do it here with respect to the American Rescue Plan funds at issue.

THE COURT: As I understand it, you say in your papers at various points that Congress encouraged the Department of Education to be flexible and to allow these extensions; is that right?

MR. AMER: Yes, that's the Senate Committee on Appropriations Report that urged the Department to be liberal with granting extensions and to require minimal burden in terms of documentation. And that's exactly what happened in terms of the prior round of extensions.

But more to the point, Congress, in enacting the legislation that appropriated these funds, didn't specifically tie the availability of the funds to the continuing existence of the pandemic, like they did in these other statutes that we cite to on page 24 of our opening brief. And additionally, Congress did not claw back the funds once the pandemic was declared over, which is something else that Congress did in other instances. For example, we note in the Fiscal

Responsibility Act of 2023, Congress pulled back funding that had not been tapped. So by specifying in the American Rescue Plan statute that the funds are to address long-term effects of the pandemic, and by not tying the funds to the end of the health emergency, and by not clawing the money back as it did in other instances, it's clear we think that Congress obviously intended the funds to remain available after the government declared the health emergency to be over, which shows that the Department's actions here rescinding the funding and declaring the window to be already closed is contrary to law.

The final two factors of the preliminary injunction test, your Honor, are public interest and balance of the equities, and I'll just briefly go over those. As your Honor is aware, those two factors merge here, because the government is a party. We submit that because of the strong showing that the states have made on irreparable harm and likelihood of success, that's sufficient to establish that an injunction would in fact be in the public interest. We think, moreover, there is a strong public interest in preventing the Department from violating the APA by abruptly rescinding the prior extension approvals, which afforded the states, until March of 2026—so another additional year—to draw down on this critical funding intended to combat the devastating long-term effects of the pandemic on students and educators. And finally, defendants, for their part, we submit, have not articulated any

harm that they will suffer in maintaining the status quo here, which, by the way, would simply require the Department to honor the extension approvals it had previously determined were justified based on the showing that each state has already made when requesting the extensions in the first place.

THE COURT: If I were to grant the preliminary injunction, would I have to find likelihood of success both on arbitrary and capriciousness and contrariness to law?

MR. AMER: No, you don't, your Honor. Just any one of the claims would support entry of a preliminary injunction under the four-part test. So as long as the Court was satisfied that at least one of the claims had a likelihood of success, that would satisfy that prong.

In conclusion, your Honor, the states ask the Court to preliminarily enjoin the defendants from implementing and enforcing the March 28th rescission letter as against the plaintiff-states, so that their education agencies can continue, during the course of this case, to submit timely payment requests to liquidate their funding just as they had been doing prior to March 28th. And as the Court will see in our proposed preliminary injunction order, we also ask that the Court require the defendants to provide two weeks' notice to both the Court and to the plaintiffs if they intend to modify the states' liquidation periods on any other grounds other than those that are set forth in the rescission letter.

THE COURT: The Department of Education has already rescinded the grant so you cannot today submit a reimbursement request in the manner that you could prior to March 28. You're asking me to enter a preliminary injunction that allows you to do that. Why, therefore, isn't that a mandatory injunction as

MR. AMER: So we think it is a prohibitory injunction. It's simply asking the Court to maintain the status quo as it existed before the rescission letter was issued. I think the defendants' position is that it's a mandatory injunction and that it requires a heightened showing. We absolutely disagree with that. This is a classic example of a prohibitory injunction. It merely seeks to turn the clock back to 5:02 p.m. Eastern time March 28th and have the parties proceed just as they had been proceeding the minute before the challenged action took effect.

THE COURT: Thank you.

opposed to a prohibitory injunction?

MR. AMER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Connolly?

MR. CONNOLLY: Thank you, your Honor. Good morning again. Christopher Connolly from the U.S. Attorney's Office on behalf of the defendants.

At the same time that the Department of Education rescinded its prior extension of the liquidation deadline, it invited states to seek project-specific extensions of the

liquidation period. It provided further information about that process just a few days later in its April 3rd letter. The grant money at issue here is still available to states. To date, the Department has received over 200 applications from around 30 states, including at least one of the plaintiff-states here. The Department has already approved extensions of the liquidation periods for certain projects. And where it's declined to approve extensions, states are able to appeal that declination administratively.

THE COURT: But the prior program ended, right? It was rescinded by virtue of the secretary's determination.

MR. CONNOLLY: The prior program didn't end. The prior extension deadlines that had been extended until March 2026 were ended with the provision that states could then seek project-specific extensions, which many of them have done and some of them have already received.

THE COURT: And will they receive approval of those requests if they were to submit an application? Is there a guarantee that they will receive approval for those programs if they were to submit an application in accordance with the secretary's letter?

MR. CONNOLLY: So what happens is, states seek an extension, a project-specific extension; they describe the project that they're seeking the extension for; the Department reviews that; and where the Department grants that extension of

the liquidation deadline, then the state proceeds with the project that it had described, and then will come back to seek reimbursement for the funds expended as part of that project, and will presumably have to demonstrate through the receipts and stuff that, you know, the work that they did was related to the project that they'd sought the extension for; and then they would receive the funds.

THE COURT: So the answer to my question is no, there's no guarantee; that if they were to make application anew with respect to projects that had previously been approved, there's a possibility that they will not receive reimbursements for those monies expended.

MR. CONNOLLY: As I understand it, that would only be in the situation where the work that they undertook was not related to the project that they had explained. The expectation is that when you get this extension of the liquidation period, a project-specific extension, the states have described the specific project that they're going to be undertaking, that they will then be able to draw down those funds after they've engaged in the project. So I think the answer to your Honor would be yes.

THE COURT: So then there was no rescission?

MR. CONNOLLY: There was a rescission of the March 28,

2026, extension, yes, subject to the ability of states to seek

project-specific extensions, which many of them are in the

process of doing, and which the Department is in the process of reviewing.

THE COURT: But if these projects were already preapproved or approved prior to the rescission of March 28th, why would they have to reapply?

MR. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, as I understand it, when the states initially sought these funds, they would describe, perhaps in more general terms, the types of projects that they were intending to undertake in connection with these appropriations. What the Department is asking states to do here is, to the extent that they require additional time to draw down some of those funds, to identify and describe the specific projects that remain at issue. And then the Department is considering those on a project-specific basis, and where it determines it's appropriate, it is extending those liquidation periods for those projects.

THE COURT: So again, I believe I asked Mr. Amer whether the states had undergone that process in the first instance, and I believe his answer was that yes, that the states did, in accordance with the contours of the funding programs, submit proposed projects, which were approved, and for which they simply had to submit the receipts, as I put it, in order to be reimbursed for the completion of those projects. So what you are saying, I think, is that, well, you have to do that again, right?

MR. CONNOLLY: You have to do that again, and as I—obviously at this point we have the complaint, we have the allegations, and I think broadly, the government agrees with what Mr. Amer is describing, but I think the distinction is that those initial applications would not necessarily have gone into the level of detail about specific projects that the Department is now asking for in connection with these project-specific extensions. In some instances perhaps states described those projects specifically; in other instances it was perhaps more of a broader indication of the type of work that they were intending to use the funds for. And now, to seek to get further extensions of that liquidation period, the Department is simply asking the states to describe with specificity the projects for which they require additional extensions.

THE COURT: Again, as I understand it—and to your point, we only have the complaint, we have several declarations—not only did they have to initially submit projects for approval, but when they wanted to extend the time to be reimbursed, they had to provide additional details as to why that was necessary, correct?

MR. CONNOLLY: The states made applications for extensions before, yes; not on a project-specific basis, but they provided some explanation for why they were requesting an extension of that liquidation period.

THE COURT: And as I read the complaint, in every instance at least that's cited in the complaint, the response that they received for approval of an extension was after careful review or after careful consideration. Do you have any reason to believe that that did not take place—that is to say, careful review or careful consideration?

MR. CONNOLLY: I have no reason to believe that that did not take place for the extensions that were described in the complaint. Again, I mean, taking the allegations in the complaint as true at this point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CONNOLLY: So because these grant funds are still available to the states and because states can continue to seek and have sought and are obtaining these project-specific extensions, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate at this time.

I can briefly walk through each stage of the preliminary injunction analysis, beginning with likelihood of success. And in particular, there is no final agency action here. Courts have emphasized that the finality inquiry is flexible and pragmatic, and here, the rescission of the extensions on March 28th was coupled, both in the March 28 letter and in the April 3rd letter, with the invitation to states to seek project-specific extensions. And so contrary to some of what the states suggest, this is not foreclosing the

opportunity for states to access these funds and to draw down these funds for the projects that they intended to use them for; it is inviting them to submit some additional information about the specific projects, which the Department is reviewing as they come in and has already started to issue decisions on, that will allow for the continued extension of the liquidation period for these specific projects. So whether and to what extent these states are truly foreclosed from accessing these funds for the projects that they're intending to undertake remains an open question, at least until they submit those extension requests and obtain a decision from the Department on, you know, whether that liquidation period will in fact be extended.

THE COURT: So it remains an open question and is not, as I believe you suggested earlier, well, you know, you can put in your application, you can give reasons why an extension is needed, and the likelihood is that yes, you will get reimbursed.

MR. CONNOLLY: You put in your application with respect to a specific project and you seek an extension of the liquidation period for that, and where the Department grants that, then you have up until that new deadline to liquidate funds relating to that project. And then—

THE COURT: Where the Department grants that, but what about where the Department does not?

MR. CONNOLLY: Where the Department denies an extension request, there is an administrative appeal option.

Within 30 days of that denial, you can appeal within the Department for further consideration and can submit additional information in support of your request for an extension of the liquidation period with respect to that project. And I believe in our papers we cited to a Department of Education website that is similar to the April 3rd letter but then builds off it, providing additional information about the way the process works and noting, as I believe the April 3rd letter does not, the ability to appeal within the Department in the event that an extension request is denied.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CONNOLLY: So because that remains an option for states and because the possibility continues to exist for states to obtain these extensions of the liquidation period, the kind of just the precise issue that the plaintiffs are challenging here is not one by which rights and obligations have necessarily been determined. Again, some states have already applied for extensions of the liquidation period for certain projects and have obtained them. So now there's a final agency action that allows them to continue to liquidate those funds. And for other states, that remains a possibility.

THE COURT: Have any applications for extensions been denied?

MR. CONNOLLY: There have been. As I understand it, your Honor, a set of applications have been determined at this point. Some projects have been approved for liquidation extensions and others, yes, have been denied for extensions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CONNOLLY: So in light of that flexible and pragmatic inquiry, the rescission itself on the March 28th letter of the prior extension should not be considered a final agency action. But to the extent that it were, it was not arbitrary and capricious and it was also not contrary to law. And perhaps I'll take those in reverse order.

First of all, with respect to contrary to law, plaintiffs' argument is—

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. CONNOLLY: Contrary to law.

THE COURT: Contrary to law.

MR. CONNOLLY: Pardon me. Plaintiffs' argument is that where Congress wanted appropriations to terminate with the end of the public health emergency, it said so, and that's true. But what the Department is doing here is not terminating these appropriated funds and it's not cutting off access for the states to these appropriated funds. Congress did—and we explain this in our background section in our brief—it did place at least initial time frames for when these appropriated funds were supposed to be accessed, and beyond that, by

regulation, the Department can extend those deadlines where doing so is justified. And it did that, and it is now continuing to do that.

THE COURT: Well, no. It stopped it, and then it created a different avenue for accessing those funds.

MR. CONNOLLY: That is true. I mean, a different process for determining whether those extensions are justified. But it's not contrary to the statute, or contrary to these appropriations, because it's not actually terminating the states' ability to access these funds. It is simply implementing a new procedure whereby states can continue to access those funds, and there's nothing in any of these appropriations that would preclude the Department from taking a project-specific look and determining whether, you know, extension of the liquidation periods is appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, except that I'm told that the Senate explicitly—I don't know what word to use here—directed, encouraged, told, suggested—that the Department of Education, in administering these funds, be flexible and be as minimally intrusive into the states' ability to access these funds as possible. And that's not what this new process is doing, is it?

MR. CONNOLLY: Respectfully, your Honor, it's not as intrusive as plaintiffs would suggest. I mean, they talk about like a six-part process, but really, most of those parts are

just, you know, review within the Department to determine whether to grant a liquidation extension. For the states, you see in the April 3rd letter, in many instances the kind of basic information that they need to supply, as well as, to be sure, an explanation of the specific project and why a further extension is necessary. But that's in keeping with the Department's regulatory authority to grant these extensions where they're justified. And in the Department's view, given the time that's elapsed since the end of the public health emergency, it's appropriate to take a project-specific look at where states are seeking further extension of the liquidation period, and that is consistent with or certainly not inconsistent with the language of the appropriations.

THE COURT: And so the Department of Education changed its mind.

MR. CONNOLLY: The Department of Education changed its mind, and it has the ability to do that.

THE COURT: And when it does that, doesn't it have to provide a reasoned explanation as to why it's changing its mind?

MR. CONNOLLY: It does, and that was what the March 28 letter did.

THE COURT: Tell me how it did that.

MR. CONNOLLY: The March 28th letter explained that in light of the end of the public health emergency and in light of

the Department's priorities, it was, as a general matter, no longer appropriate for extensions of these liquidation periods to occur, but that states would be able to seek extensions of those liquidation periods on a project-specific basis that would allow the Department to evaluate the project in light of Congress's goals in appropriating these funds.

THE COURT: And is that reason sufficient on the facts of this case? And I say that because, to Mr. Amer's point, yeah, the COVID emergency is over, but it was over two years ago, and now all of a sudden they're saying, well, you know, we shouldn't be using public funds in connection with a pandemic that's almost two years old now. And also, there's no talk of this in any of the papers, but, I mean, implicit in these programs, in these funding programs, is that I think—and you can tell me if I'm wrong—that there was a loss in educational attainment by all of these children occasioned by the pandemic and the requirement that there be remote learning, if learning there was taking place, and therefore implicit in the funding was that of course it would go beyond the emergency because it was only after the emergency that the school authorities would have the opportunity to address that educational loss.

MR. CONNOLLY: I agree that it was implicit that these funds would continue to be available after the emergency, and the Department is not preventing these funds from being available after the emergency. What the Department is doing is

requesting project-specific information from states so that the Department, at a more, I guess, granular level can determine whether, given where we are vis-à-vis the pandemic and the end of the public health emergency, the projects that the states are seeking to undertake remain consistent with Congress's goals in appropriating these funds.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CONNOLLY: The decision is also not arbitrary and capricious. The regulation at issue here, 2 C.F.R. 200.344(c), specifies that the Department can grant extensions where it is justified. And again, that is what the Department is doing. It is granting extensions here, where further extensions are justified. It has changed its procedures for doing that, but the change in procedures is within the parameters of the regulation and, again, not contrary to the appropriation statutes themselves.

Turning to irreparable harm, here again, states can and have obtained extensions of the liquidation period, so the scope of the harm and whether and to what extent it is irreparable remains at some level an open question. To the extent a state late last week received an extension of the liquidation period with respect to a project, harms that it thought might otherwise have been occasioned by the March 28th letter, that calculus is different now, right?

THE COURT: The disruption has already occurred,

right? You would agree with that.

MR. CONNOLLY: The states have alleged—and again, we have their complaint, we have their declarations—that there has been disruption that has been occasioned by the March 28th letter, yes. But the question for the irreparable harm prong is, you know, whether and to what extent the ability to obtain a further extension of the liquidation period can act upon those harms and prevent them from being irreparable, and there, we submit—I mean, one thing that I think to note, your Honor, is that in their declarations and in their opening brief, the states don't address the extension, project-specific extension process that was announced in the March 28th letter and then discussed further in the April 3rd letter, and that does bear, of course, on the nature of the harms and whether they're irreparable.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, they do discuss the project-specific process now in place and say that it imposes an additional burden. You can argue about whether that's a real burden or not, but they do address it.

MR. CONNOLLY: Right. They do. Absolutely. And their second brief does address it. But the question here is whether and to what extent that process acts upon the harms that they had otherwise articulated and can obviate those harms through the ability to obtain those project-specific extensions of the liquidation period.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CONNOLLY: And finally, and briefly, your Honor, the public interest and equities factors that are tied together here. The Department has the ability and there is a public interest in making sure that these funds are spent consistent with Congress's appropriations. That's what the Department is attempting to do here. The language of both the March 28th and April 3rd letters talks about asking the states for information on how a particular project's extension is necessary to mitigate the effects of COVID on American students' education. The Department is receiving applications from states that speak to that issue. It is reviewing them in the process that's described in the letters, and on their website, and it is in the process of making those determinations and at times granting those project-specific extensions of the liquidation period.

THE COURT: Could we go back to irreparable harm just for a minute.

MR. CONNOLLY: Certainly.

THE COURT: You didn't mention whether or not the federal government would be irreparably harmed if I were to issue the injunction. Would it?

MR. CONNOLLY: Well, your Honor, I think the potential—well, a couple things.

First of all, beginning with the public interest

articulated, one potential harm here is that states will draw down funds for projects that the Department, had it reviewed at a project-specific level, would have determined might not have qualified for the extension of the liquidation period.

THE COURT: Okay. But we're talking about appropriated funds, correct?

MR. CONNOLLY: These are appropriated funds, yes.

THE COURT: So these funds were appropriated. Initial applications were made on particular projects and were granted, right? They were approved.

MR. CONNOLLY: There was an initial project approval, yes.

THE COURT: And then there was a request for an extension to complete those projects and they had to provide additional information, and those extensions were approved after careful consideration, correct?

MR. CONNOLLY: As set forth in the complaint, correct.

THE COURT: So how is the government irreparably harmed by just allowing those determinations to stay in place and projects to go forward? They were appropriated funds.

MR. CONNOLLY: Right. I mean, the harm would be that it would prevent the Department from doing what it has now determined is appropriate to do, which is to review these specific projects at a closer level to determine whether they remain consistent with Congress's goals in appropriating the

funds. In the event that preliminary injunction is entered, the process that has been stood up, these applications that the Department is receiving, that would presumably all be put on hold. The Department would not be able to undertake the review that it's undertaking subsequent to the March 28th letter.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Amer, did you want to respond?

MR. AMER: I do have a few points, your Honor. Thank you.

Your Honor, you raised the question of whether there's any guarantee that these specific project-specific extension requests will be granted, and I think there was a suggestion that they would likely be granted, and I want to put that to rest based on what we know to date.

One of the plaintiff-states that did request some project-specific extensions was Arizona, and this past Friday, May 2nd, Arizona received A response by letter to their extension requests. And we have the letter. I'm happy to file it on the docket, your Honor, if you'd like to have the letter on the record.

THE COURT: Sure. You can do that.

MR. AMER: And there were \$7.6 million, roughly, in projects that were the subject of these project-specific extension requests. The Department approved only \$1 million

worth of these projects and denied \$6.6 million worth of these projects, so the vast majority of the project-specific extension requests were denied.

But I think more telling, your Honor, is the reason for why the projects were denied. And I'm just going to quote some of the explanations.

There's one project for about \$1.2 million, and it was denied for the following reason: "This project is providing resources to teachers rather than directly supporting students academically." That's the reason that that was denied.

For a \$4.9 million project, the extension request was denied for the following reason: "While this project provides services to students related to mitigating the effects of the pandemic, it is focused on health rather than academics." So that's why that was denied.

Another reason for a roughly \$450,000 project was:
"While this project provides support for mathematics teachers,
it does not provide services directly to students."

And then the fourth project that was denied for roughly \$110,000, the same reason as before: "This project is providing resources to teachers rather than directly supporting students academically."

So these reasons that are being given have nothing to do with whether additional time is needed to liquidate these funds. It's really seeking a complete redo of whether the

funds should have been granted in the first place, and it's completely contrary to what's provided for in the appropriations statute. If you just look at the American Rescue Plan statute, it talks about, in Section 2001(e)(2), what the uses of funds are that are permitted. It clearly includes professional development for staff, health-related reasons, so—

THE COURT: These were projects that presumably had been previously approved.

MR. AMER: Absolutely, because they were included with the original grant application and they were part of the extension request application.

So this additional process that is being imposed on the states is just an effort to now apply new and different criteria that actually runs contrary to what the appropriations statute allows, and has absolutely nothing to do with whether more time is needed or not.

And to your Honor's point about lost instruction time and why you still need to provide this intervention to students, I did want to mention that in the record—I'll just read one of the paragraphs from the New York declaration, paragraph 54 of Docket No. 26. "Without an update or confirmation that services will resume soon, our largest educational service provider under EANS—" that's the program for nonpublic schools "—who provides, among other things,

tutoring services, plans to terminate all employees that they currently have furloughed. If US DOE is not immediately required to withdraw the March 28 rescission, there will not be enough time to hire new staff and get the programs back up and running for the remainder of the 2024-25 academic year. This will result in severe harm to students, including lost instruction time and further lost opportunities to address learning losses and gaps that were the result of the pandemic—problems the ARP funding was specifically targeted to alleviate."

I think that gets right at your Honor's point. And it's not just in the complaint. This is the declaration that New York submitted, so it's in the record as evidentiary material.

I think just one last point—well, on that—is that providers of these programs and services know about the March 28th letter, and they know about the April 3rd letter, and they know about this process for submitting project-specific extensions, and they're still not willing to continue performing under these contracts. So they understand that this additional process for getting project-specific extensions doesn't suggest in any way, shape, or form that the funds are going to start flowing again, and once these letters like this May 2nd letter that I read from become public, it will cement the understanding that much of these funds are

going to be yanked and won't be approved.

THE COURT: Can you, for the record, just indicate to whom that letter is addressed and who sent the letter.

MR. AMER: Yes. So it's on United States Department of Education letterhead. It's dated May 2, 2025. So it was this past Friday. It's to the Honorable Tom Horne, H-O-R-N-E, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Arizona Department of Education, and it's signed by Hayley, H-A-Y-L-E-Y, W. Sanon, S-A-N-O-N. He's the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Acting Assistant Secretary in the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education of the U.S. Department of Education. So we will file that later today with a cover letter, your Honor.

Finally, I think my friend mentioned that the harm that the Education Department suffers is the harm due to the fact that had it reviewed the extension requests on a project-specific basis, it would have been denied because it would have been given an opportunity to have a closer look. I don't think there's any record evidence that suggests that the look that the Department previously gave to these projects, either when the applications for the grant money was originally submitted or when the extension requests were previously reviewed and approved, was anything other than a close look, so the idea that the Department is somehow being deprived, if this Court grants the injunction, of an opportunity to take a close look at these projects I think is contrary to what's in the

2.4

record. I think the record suggests that these projects were specified in the prior grant applications and in the prior extension requests, that they were looked at, and I think your Honor even asked my friend whether there's any suggestion here that the Department didn't give those a close look. So I think what the Department is saying is that the harm is not doing something that they actually already did. And that's not harm at all, your Honor.

THE COURT: Can I ask if you could speak to the issue of whether or not this is a final order, the March 28 letter.

MR. AMER: It's absolutely a final order because there's no reconsideration suggested on the blanket decision to rescind all of the extension approvals. That's not anything that's being looked at today by the Department. The letter was clear, if you look at the language of the letter, that it's effective immediately, the extension approvals are being rescinded, it's being modified to expire as of 5 p.m. on March 28th. There's no tentative nature with respect to that decision, so it's absolutely final. And again, under Section 704, even if the Department did say, you know, we'll reconsider this rescission, as long as they make the rescission operable effective immediately, it's final under the APA.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. AMER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to issue the preliminary

injunction, and we'll talk in a little bit about whether or not I should require the posting of a bond or whether I should stay this determination. But first of all, I do find that the plaintiffs are seeking a prohibitory and not a mandatory injunction. As they indicate, the last peaceable status in this case was just prior to the time that Secretary McMahon's letter of March 28 was issued, and at that time the extensions were in place. Those extensions were rescinded, and accordingly, this is a prohibitory injunction.

I further find preliminarily that this is a final order. As Mr. Amer indicated, a decision was made to rescind all extensions. There was no equivocation in that determination, and it is operable, which is to say that the states are required to abide by it, and presumably if they were to put in a request for reimbursement today, outside of the new process that has been set up for these funds, it would be rejected out of hand.

I find that the plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits on both of their causes of action with respect to arbitrary and capricious. The Department of Education changed its mind. I find that the reason proffered was not a reasonable explanation. As we have discussed, Congress intended that these funds be made available to school districts and schoolchildren. There was no reason other than the fact that the COVID emergency had ended some two

years before. However, clearly, the purpose of the funding sources of the acts that provided the funding was so that there can be funding for these programs going forward after the pandemic emergency was deemed to have ended in order to account for the loss of educational attainment that schoolchildren had suffered as a result of remote learning and other difficulties attendant to the COVID-19 pandemic.

And with respect to contrariness to law, as we discussed, Congress intended that these funds remain available. Congress intended that the Department of Education be liberal and flexible in making sure that these programs continued to be funded, and that the Department of Education not impose unreasonable obstacles in the way of state agencies looking to continue to fund those programs. As a result of the Department's actions, the plaintiffs have established irreparable harm. There are any number of declarations that have been submitted that talk about the disruption that has been caused by the March 28 letter—programs have been halted, staff has been laid off, infrastructure projects that were begun had been halted midstream, causing unusable locations within schools.

On the other hand, there's nothing before me to suggest that the government would be irreparably harmed in any way by the issuance of the preliminary injunction. These are funds that have been appropriated for particular uses.

Applications were made and approved with respect to those uses. Applications were made and approved with respect to extending the drawdown of those funds. There were substantial reliance rights that were established by the plaintiffs, which obviously were interrupted.

And again, the public interest and the balance of hardships here weigh clearly in favor of the plaintiffs, who have had to disrupt the provision of educational services to schoolchildren, who have had to halt infrastructure projects midstream because of the Department of Education's determination, and for all those reasons, the plaintiffs have clearly met all of the elements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and one will be issued.

I will be signing the form preliminary injunction that was provided by the plaintiffs.

But let's talk about a bond and a stay. Mr. Amer?
MR. AMER: Thank you, your Honor.

We do address the bond requirement in point 4 of our reply brief. Obviously, as the Court is aware, there needs to be a specific finding in the preliminary injunction order, which can be done orally, obviously, today.

We do think there's no dispute that the Court has wide discretion in setting the bond amount, including setting the bond amount at 0. I think we're talking about whether the bond should be 0 up to \$10,000, which is the nominal sum that the

defendants have requested. We think it makes sense for the amount here to be set at 0 because of the various reasons we highlight in our brief—namely, that here, this is a situation where we're seeking to enforce public interests arising out of a comprehensive federal health and welfare statute. Second Circuit has noted that that is a sufficient justification to set the bond at 0. Also, because there is no proof here of likelihood of harm to the defendants as a result of the preliminary injunction, which is one of the findings your Honor just made; that's another reason for justifying a bond at 0. And finally, we think that where the likelihood of success is so strong as it is here, that's another reason for setting the bond at 0. And we would ask, therefore, that the Court set the bond at 0.

I'd also mention that there are any number of cases that have been decided within the last couple of months where there have been challenges to this administration's agencies' actions where bonds have been set at 0.

I thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Connolly, did you wish to be heard?

MR. CONNOLLY: Sure. Just briefly, your Honor, on the bond.

Obviously, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that the Court may issue a preliminary injunction only if the movant gives security in an amount that the Court

considers proper. Here, we are simply asking, in accordance with that rule, for the entry of a de minimis bond of \$10,000.

Would your Honor like me to address the appellate issue as well?

THE COURT: Let me just deal with the bond.

I'm not going to require the issuance or the posting of a bond. As we've discussed, I find that the plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits that is greater than usual, perhaps even overwhelming. In fact, I was going to discuss whether the showing that the states have made would have been enough even to satisfy the test of a mandatory injunction. So I do find that their likelihood of success on this case is strong. And as we have been discussing, this case involves the enforcement of public interest arising out of a comprehensive federal health and welfare statute. So I will not require the posting of a bond.

On the issue of the appeal, a stay pending appeal, Mr. Connolly, I'm happy to hear you.

MR. CONNOLLY: Certainly, your Honor.

The government will confer in light of the Court's ruling. As your Honor knows, decision whether or not to appeal rests with the Solicitor General. We would ask that in the event the Solicitor General determines to appeal your Honor's ruling, that the Court stay the preliminary injunction pending a disposition of that appeal. And obviously in the event that

decision is made, we can provide further information in a letter to the Court, but we would be asking for a stay if an appeal is authorized.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: Your Honor, we don't think that there is a need for this Court to issue a stay. This is not a situation that involves any exigency. There are no planes on the tarmac about to take off. There is going to be a process where the states now submit their payment requests as timely requests as a result of the injunction, the defendants will have an opportunity to review those timely requests, and in the interim, they certainly have time to go to the Second Circuit and seek whatever relief by way of a stay that they feel is necessary.

THE COURT: I will not be staying the implementation of the preliminary injunction.

Is there anything else that we should discuss today, Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: Nothing from the plaintiffs. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Mr. Connolly?

MR. CONNOLLY: No. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. In that event, we are adjourned.

We'll be issuing the injunction and posting it on ECF.

Thank you all for your very, very helpful arguments. 000